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Pharmaceuticals have become an important part of health care, both in 
terms of treatment outcomes and in terms of public spending. Pharmaceu-
ticals now account for almost a fifth of total health spending in OECD-
countries.1 Both pharmaceutical innovations and the aging of the popula-
tion explain the increasing importance of pharmaceuticals in health care. 
Cancer, high blood pressure and cholesterol, and depression are examples 
of diseases where pharmaceutical innovations have improved the treat-
ment, but also triggered increased costs for public health insurance 
schemes in Nordic countries. In Norway, the consumption of anti-
cholesterols per inhabitant increased by close to 340 percent from 2000 to 
2009. Both Finland and Denmark have seen similar growth rates. The 
growth rates in Sweden and Iceland have been lower, but also these coun-
tries have seen a sharp increase in the consumption of anti-cholesterols. 
The life-cycle of a new drug entering the market can be divided into 
two phases. The first phase is the one in which a patent protects the inno-
vating company from direct competition from other companies. The pa-
tent holder has exclusive rights to produce and sell the drug. The second 
phase begins when the patent expires and other firms are free to produce 
and market the exact same – generic – drug. 
The abilities of governments to control – or curb – costs in these two 
phases are very different. When a new drug is approved and enters the 
market, the main mechanism for controlling costs is by setting require-
ments for prescription and reimbursement (restricting the use) and by 
setting price-caps. In addition, parallel import of pharmaceuticals within 
EU restricts the ability of the innovating company to increase prices in 
one single country – competition between direct import and parallel im-
port to some extent hinders third-degree price discrimination in the Euro-
pean market. In Sweden and Denmark, parallel import is actively used 
when determining the patients’ copayment (see Section 3.3).    
For a patented drug, cost control is closely linked to the quality of the 
drug relative to other treatment options for the same disease. Reducing 
spending on innovative drugs (phase one) involves a tradeoff with quality 
of health care. If a new drug enables a considerably improved treatment 
compared to other available drugs, curbing the costs for this patient group 
may be welfare-reducing. If instead the new drug is less innovative (“me-
                                                        
1 Health at a Glance (2011). 
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too-drug”), the cost can be curbed with therapeutic competition without 
hurting the patient.  
With the entry of generic drugs (phase two), large cost savings can be 
realized if the insurance schemes are able to trigger price competition 
among the producers. A successful implementation of generic competi-
tion can generate a cost saving without lowering the quality of treatment.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we briefly 
review the Nordic pharmaceutical market. In Section 2, we continue by 
explaining the main regulatory policy measures used by governments in 
these countries. Section 3 provides a review of some of the findings in the 
empirical research that has been undertaken to investigate regulation and 
competition in these markets. We conclude the paper in Section 4 by 
returning to the question raised by the title of our paper.  
1. Nordic pharmaceutical markets 
In this section, we take a closer look at the pharmaceutical market in the 
Nordic countries. We first describe the level and development of pharma-
ceutical expenditure in the national markets. Then, we consider the price 
and the consumption levels of pharmaceuticals in order to explore sources 
of variation in pharmaceutical spending across countries. 
1.1 Pharmaceutical sales/expenditures 
The figure below shows the development of pharmaceutical expenditure 
per capita, measured in USD (OECD-purchasing power parity), from 
1980 to 2010. There is a significant variation across the Nordic countries. 
Iceland has the highest level of pharmaceutical expenditure with USD 
523 per capita in 2010, whereas Denmark has the lowest expenditure 
level with USD 331 per capita. Thus, pharmaceutical expenditure in Ice-
land is almost 60 percent higher than in Denmark, when making the 
OECD-purchasing power adjustment. We also see that Finland, Norway 
and Sweden experienced higher growth rates than Denmark during the 
1990’s. 
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Figure 1. Pharmaceutical expenditure (USD-PPP) per capita, 1980-2010 
 
Source: OECD Health Data. 
 
The average annual growth in pharmaceutical expenditure (measured 
in USD-PPP) from 1990 to 2004 was as high as 12 percent for Norway 
and 10 percent for Sweden. The annual growth rate in Denmark was 7 
percent. In Norway, pharmaceutical expenditure has been stable, or even 
slightly declining, since 2004. 
International comparisons of consumption levels are difficult and con-
troversial (see Almås, 2012). A simple exchange rate conversion changes 
the picture dramatically by turning Denmark into a country with high 
pharmaceutical consumption as compared to other Nordic countries. The 
expenditure levels in 2011, measured with euro per capita, are as follows: 
Table1. Pharmaceutical expenditure per capita. Euro. 2011 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Euro per 
capita, 2011 
400 360 310 360 
Source: LMI. Facts and figures. 
 
The difference between the two measures in Figure 1 and Table 1 is 
due to the PPP-adjustment. 
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1.2 Prices of pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceutical expenditure (sale) is the product of prices and volumes. In 
this section, we consider the prices in the Nordic countries, whereas in the 
next section we consider the volumes. Comparing the prices of pharma-
ceuticals across countries is a challenge, since these products are by na-
ture heterogeneous.2 There have been a couple of recent studies on the 
pharmaceutical price levels including the Nordic countries. Brekke et al. 
(2011b) compare the prices of pharmaceuticals in Norway with nine Eu-
ropean countries. They use a sample of the 300 most selling substances as 
the basis for comparison, and compute a wide set of price indices in order 
to measure the price levels for all substances and for various submarkets 
such as the on-patent and off-patent market segments. The figure below 
reports the price indices for the Nordic countries with Norway as the base 
country with a price index normalized to zero.   
Figure 2. Bilateral price indices based on average substance prices at pharmacy 
levels, 2010 
 
Source: Brekke et al. (2011b). 
 
We see that the Norwegian price level tends to be the lowest among 
the Nordic countries. If we look at all substances in the sample, importing 
the Swedish price level would result in a 5.3 percent increase in the 
pharmaceutical expenditures in Norway assuming that the consumption is 
                                                        
2 Danzon (1999) gives a detailed discussion of challenges related to cross-country price 
comparisons.  
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unchanged. Importing the Finnish and Danish price levels results in even 
higher expenditure increases of 18.6 and 25.4 percent, respectively. The 
price differences are higher in the on-patent market segment, while for 
substances in the off-patent market segment with generic competition 
Sweden does, in fact, have a lower price level than Norway. 
Note that if the price indices show that the Norwegian consumption of 
pharmaceuticals would be 10 percent more expensive if using, say, Swe-
dish prices, the reverse is not necessarily true. The reason is that we then 
need to replace the Norwegian consumption weights with the Swedish 
consumption weights, implying that although the prices are the same, the 
price indices would be different. In a recent report, Brekke and Holmås 
(2012) have computed the Swedish price indices for the on-patent market 
segment and contrasted these with the price indices obtained in Brekke et 
al. (2011b). The results show that there is a weak tendency for the base 
country to become cheaper, but the results are not qualitatively altered. 
This is also confirmed in a recent study by the Swedish regulatory body 
TLV written by Arnberg et al. (2012). Thus, cross-country price differ-
ences might partly explain the differences in pharmaceutical sales (ex-
penditures) per capita between the Nordic countries. 
1.3 Consumption of pharmaceuticals 
The second source of differences in pharmaceutical sales across the Nor-
dic countries is the consumption of pharmaceuticals. Since drugs are sold 
in different pack sizes with different strengths and formulations, we need 
a measure to make consumption comparable across substances. The most 
common measure is defined daily doses (DDDs).3 The figure below 
shows the consumption of pharmaceuticals (in DDDs) normalized by per 
1 000 capita for the Nordic countries. 
                                                        
3 This is a measure developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) that allows for a 
comparison of consumption across products with different substances, dosages, and formulati-
ons. A DDD is based on the recommend treatment for the main indication of the specific drug. 
For instance, if the DDD is 20mg of a given substance, then a pack with 10 tablets of 10mg 
would yield a volume of 5 DDDs. 
 Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? 253 
Figure 3. Consumption, DDD per 1 000 capita  
 
Source: OECD Health Data: Pharmaceutical market. 
 
We see that the consumption of pharmaceuticals in Denmark, Iceland 
and Norway is low as compared to in Finland and Sweden. Finland has 
the highest consumption level in 2010 with close to 2 800 DDDs per 
1 000 capita. This is about 20 percent higher than the consumption level 
in Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The variation in the consumption of 
pharmaceuticals across the Nordic countries is substantial, but they have 
all experienced a high consumption growth with an accompanying in-
crease in pharmaceutical costs.  
2. Pharmaceutical regulations in Nordic countries 
The pharmaceutical market is characterized by numerically low price 
elasticities on the demand side and market power on the supply side.4 An 
unregulated market would in this situation be likely to yield high pharma-
ceutical prices and correspondingly high expenditures of drug consump-
tion. Most countries therefore use several regulatory instruments to con-
                                                        
4 See Scherer (2000) for an overview of specific features of the pharmaceutical market. 
Brekke (2009) also offers a similar overview with a focus on the Norwegian market. 
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trol prices and total consumption of prescription drugs.5 In this section, 
we describe some of the most important regulations, and discuss briefly 
how they are expected to affect prices and the demand for pharmaceuti-
cals. We also categorize the Nordic countries with respect to the regulato-
ry instruments used.  
2.1 Regulatory instruments 
We can make a fundamental distinction between supply-side and de-
mand-side regulation. Supply-side regulation attempts to directly control 
drug prices and can apply to different levels of the vertical supply chain; 
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers (pharmacies). Demand-side reg-
ulation attempts to control prices and the consumption of pharmaceuticals 
indirectly through the design of the reimbursement system. Therefore, we 
can distinguish between the regulation of the price (or the margin) that 
the suppliers of drugs receive (supply-side regulation), and the regulation 
of the price that consumers actually pay (demand-side regulation).  
Demand-side regulations 
Health insurance implies that patients (potentially also doctors) are not 
very responsive to prices of alternative drugs. Insurers therefore usually 
do not offer a 100 percent coverage of medical expenses, but impose cost 
sharing on patients through copayments. The structure of the copayments 
is a key issue for making patients more conscious of the pharmaceutical 
costs. In this section, we first discuss the more regular copayment 
schemes that are used, and then describe a more recent and increasingly 
popular copayment scheme called reference pricing. Finally, we will 
discuss a couple of other (non-price) instruments that are employed by 
insurers. 
The regular copayment schemes usually take two different forms: de-
ductibles or coinsurance. Formally, we may write these two copayment 
schemes as follows: 
 
                                                        
5
 Danzon (1997) offers an overview of pharmaceutical price regulations with examples from 
various countries. 
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if deductible scheme
if coinsurance scheme
d
c
a p

 

 
 
where  0,c p  is the copayment,  0,d p  is the deductible,  0,1a  
is the coinsurance rate, and 0p   is the price of the prescribed drug. In 
the case of 0c  , there is full insurance coverage, whereas if c p  there 
is no insurance coverage.6 A deductible is simply a flat fee (say EUR 5) 
that patients have to pay when purchasing the prescribed drug. Deducti-
bles impose demand-side cost sharing, but the cost-sharing is regressive 
in the sense that more expensive drugs face a higher coverage than 
cheaper drugs. 
A disadvantage of deductibles is that the copayment is not linked to 
the price of the drug. This implies that patients (or prescribing doctors) 
would not be responsive to the relative prices of alternative drugs. Thus, 
demand is likely to be price inelastic under a deductible scheme, enabling 
the pharmaceutical firms to charge high prices. Some insurers (countries) 
have therefore introduced more refined schemes with higher (lower) de-
ductibles for expensive (cheaper) drugs. However, the correspondence 
between the price of the drug and the price patients face (the copayment) 
is still weak, so demand is not likely to be very price elastic even under 
multi-tiered deductible schemes.  
Many insurers (countries) have therefore adopted coinsurance 
schemes, which introduce a direct link between drug prices and copay-
ments. Under this scheme, patients pay a defined share (say 30 percent) 
of the price of the drug. Copayments of alternative drugs would reflect 
the price differences only adjusted by the coinsurance rate. Coinsurance is 
therefore likely to induce more price responsiveness on the demand-side 
and, in turn, some degree of price competition between alternative thera-
peutic drugs.  
One issue with coinsurance schemes is that the copayments for expen-
sive drugs can be considerable. Some insurers (countries) therefore offer 
a higher coverage for costly drug therapies. This can be done in several 
ways. One way is to impose lower coinsurance rates for more expensive 
drugs. Another way is to impose caps on the copayments and then offer a 
100 percent coverage for additional expenditures. The disadvantage of 
                                                        
6 The latter applies to over-the-counter drugs, as well as prescription drugs that are not on 
the insurer’s reimbursement list. 
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these adjustments is, of course, that they make demand less price elastic 
and therefore counteract the intention of coinsurance regimes. 
If cost-sharing were the main concern for the insurers, then (a refined) 
deductible scheme could do equally well as coinsurance. However, insur-
ers tend to prefer coinsurance to deductibles, because of the direct link to 
the drug price that makes demand more price elastic and increases the 
potential for price competition between alternative pharmaceuticals.  
Let us illustrate the potential effects of coinsurance schemes on the 
pricing and cost-sharing between patients and insurers. In the below table, 
we have constructed an example with an increase in the coinsurance rate 
from 0.2 to 0.3. This is assumed to make demand more price elastic and 
trigger a price reduction by the pharmaceutical companies. In Case A the 
response is weak and the price is only reduced by EUR 1, whereas in 
Case B, the response is strong and results in a price reduction of EUR 4.  
Table 2. Copayments and coverage when price responses to coinsurance rates 
 Coinsurance 
rate 
Drug price Copayment 3rd-party 
payment 
Case A: 
Weak price 
response 
0.2 € 10 € 2.0 € 8.0 
0.3   € 9 € 2.7 € 6.3 
Case B: 
Strong price 
response 
0.2 € 10 € 2.0 € 8.0 
0.3   € 6 € 1.8 € 4.2 
Source: Own construction. 
 
In Case A with a weak price response, a higher coinsurance rate is 
mainly shifting the costs from the insurer (third-party payer) to the pa-
tient. Increasing the coinsurance rate is therefore almost equivalent to 
offering a lower insurance coverage. However, in Case B with the strong 
price reduction, a higher coinsurance rate does not only reduce the pay-
ment for the insurer, but in fact also for the patient. In this case, a higher 
coinsurance rate is actually increasing the insurance coverage to the pa-
tients, since the de facto copayment has become lower. This example 
illustrates the two effects of coinsurance: (i) the direct effect is to shift 
costs from payer to patient; (ii) the indirect effect is to lower the prices of 
pharmaceuticals and thus, the total payment for pharmaceuticals. 
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Reference pricing, sometimes also called internal referencing, is a co-
payment scheme that has become increasingly popular in recent years. 
This scheme introduces high-powered incentives for patients to choose 
cheaper alternative medicines. Under reference pricing, drugs are classi-
fied into different reference groups based on therapeutic effect. For each 
reference group, the regulator sets a reference price, which is the maxi-
mum reimbursable price for all drugs in the reference group. Any positive 
difference between the actual drug price and the reference price is not 
reimbursable. Formally, we can write the copayment under reference 
pricing (with coinsurance) as follows: 
 
   
 
a r p r if p r
c
a p if p r
   
 
 
 
 
where  0,r p  is the reference price. The effect of reference pricing is 
to increase the price elasticity of demand for drugs priced above the ref-
erence price. The lower the reference price is set, the more price elastic 
demand is likely to be. Under this scheme, the insurance coverage is low-
er for expensive drugs, which is in contrast to deductible and coinsurance 
schemes. The aim of reference pricing is to induce consumers to select 
cheaper alternatives and stimulate price competition between producers 
of therapeutically related drugs. 
The reference pricing schemes vary according to (i) how broadly the 
reference groups are defined, and (ii) how the reference price is deter-
mined. The most narrow, but also most common, definition of reference 
groups only includes therapeutically equivalent drugs (i.e., same sub-
stance) for which the patent protection has expired. This scheme, often 
called generic reference pricing, has the aim of inducing patients to select 
cheaper generic versions instead of high-priced brand-names. A less nar-
row definition is also based on therapeutically equivalent drugs, but ex-
tends the scheme to also including patent-protected drugs. This scheme 
aims at stimulating competition from parallel-imported drugs in the on-
patent market segment. The more broadly defined reference pricing 
schemes include therapeutically related drugs (with different substances) 
in the reference groups. The intention of therapeutic reference pricing 
schemes is to stimulate competition from therapeutic substitutes. Howev-
er, the therapeutic reference pricing schemes are also likely to limit the 
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profits (patent rent) of the patent-protected drugs, and are therefore more 
controversial from a policy perspective.7 
Finally, the reference pricing schemes vary according to how the ref-
erence price is defined. Generally, the reference price is set somewhere 
between the highest priced and the lowest priced drug in the reference 
group. The strict regimes define the reference price equal to the cheapest 
drugs, implying that the patient faces a surcharge on every other drug in 
the reference group. In most regimes, the reference price is updated over 
time according to price changes by the pharmaceutical producers, and is 
therefore endogenously determined by market prices.8 
There are also non-price demand-side instruments that affect the pric-
ing and consumption of drugs. First, most insurers (countries) require the 
pharmaceutical firms to report cost-efficiency or a cost-benefit analysis 
before placing the drug on the reimbursement list. These analyses would 
include a suggested price by the pharmaceutical companies. Obviously, 
suggesting a very high price would imply a low cost-efficiency ratio, and 
therefore a lower probability for reimbursement. Thus, there is an implicit 
trade-off for the pharmaceutical companies in their price setting between 
a lower margin and a higher probability of getting on the reimbursement 
list. Some insurers use the reimbursement listing procedure actively as a 
negotiation tool, and exclude drugs that do not have a favorable pricing 
relative to the existing therapeutic alternatives.  
Second, the allocation of physician’s budgets for prescription drugs is 
an instrument that some insurers (countries) have implemented. This 
instrument has been used in the UK and Germany. The insurer computes 
a budget for each physician based on her list of patients and the cost of 
drugs. If the physician only prescribes high-cost drugs, the budget will 
quickly be spent and the patient would need to go to another physician to 
obtain her drug. The idea is that these budgets should induce the physi-
cians to take into account the cost of drugs, and prescribe cheaper alterna-
tives (e.g., generics) when available.  
                                                        
7 Brekke et al. (2007) study theoretically the effects of different reference pricing schemes, 
and find that therapeutic reference pricing induces stronger price competition and lower profits 
than generic reference pricing (or regular coinsurance).  
8 Brekke,  Holmås and Straume (2011) set up a model with endogenous and exogenous refe-
rence pricing and show that endogenous reference pricing gives generic firms a strategic incenti-
ve to lower their prices, not just to capture market shares from brand-names, but also to manipu-
late the reference price and make the brand-name more costly for patients.  
 Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? 259 
Supply-side regulations 
The supply side in pharmaceutical markets consists of a set of vertically 
related providers. Upstream we have the pharmaceuticals companies. 
These firms can be divided into two groups; brand-name and generic 
producers. The brand-name producers are typically innovating firms that 
invest in R&D and marketing, whereas the generic producers copy the 
original drugs and once the patent protection has expired, may enter the 
market with these copy products. Downstream, there are distributors 
(wholesalers and parallel traders) and retailers (pharmacies). There is a 
wide set of supply-side regulations that restrict the behavior and trade of 
the vertically related firms. Here, we focus on the restrictions that are 
aimed at affecting the pricing and demand for pharmaceuticals. This in-
cludes regulations of prices, margins, and entry into national markets. 
Many insurers (countries) directly control the pricing of drugs. The 
most common way of controling prices is to impose a price cap that de-
fines the maximum price a provider can charge for a specific drug on the 
market. Price cap regulation obviously curbs the market power of phar-
maceutical firms, but could be harmful to innovation as the profit is re-
duced. The interesting question is therefore how the price cap is set by the 
insurer.  
An increasingly popular price cap scheme is international reference 
pricing (external referencing). Under this scheme, the price cap for a 
given drug is determined by the prices of the same drug in a set of refer-
ence countries. The exact formula for the price cap varies from country to 
country, but is usually a weighted average of the prices of the drug in the 
foreign countries. The strictness of the price cap scheme would therefore 
depend on the countries selected in the reference group, and whether the 
formula imposes a price cap at the lower end of the price distribution in 
the foreign countries. 
International reference pricing is a simple procedure for fixing the 
price cap and ensures that the price level in a given country is not at the 
higher end. However, this scheme relies on foreign countries setting drug 
prices that offer optimal returns on the R&D investments. The most obvi-
ous effect of international reference pricing is that is contributes to an 
international harmonization of drug prices. The more countries that apply 
this instrument, the stronger is the effect. This scheme would therefore 
prevent international price discrimination by the pharmaceutical firms. 
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The incentives for innovation are not likely to be optimal under interna-
tional reference pricing. 
Price cap regulation is usually imposed at either the manufacturer or 
the wholesale level. To make the price cap binding at the retail level, 
most insurers (countries) impose a mark-up regulation on the downstream 
firms. One interesting issue is that different mark-up schemes could affect 
the final consumer prices through the pharmacies’ dispensing incentives. 
More specifically, if pharmacy mark-ups are set as a percentage add-on to 
wholesale prices, pharmacies would have a financial incentive to increase 
their (absolute) mark-up by dispensing more expensive drugs. This incen-
tive can be eliminated by setting the mark-up as a flat fee, implying that 
the pharmacies would be indifferent between dispensing a cheap or an 
expensive drug profitwise. However, a regressive mark-up scheme, where 
for instance the percentage mark-up is lower for more expensive drugs, 
gives incentives for pharmacies to dispense cheaper rather than expensive 
drugs. As we will see below, all these alternatives are currently in use in 
the Nordic countries. 
There are also non-price instruments on the supply-side that are likely 
to affect the pricing and consumption of pharmaceuticals. Generic substi-
tution regulation allows or requires pharmacies to substitute a prescribed 
brand-name drug with a cheaper generic version. This regulation is often 
combined with reference pricing to facilitate the sales of generics. How-
ever, the pharmacies’ incentives for generic substitution depend on their 
financial gains from this costly activity. If the mark-up regulation is pro-
gressive (e.g., the percentage add-on on the wholesale price), then phar-
macies will benefit from dispensing the prescribed high-priced brand-
name. Thus, for generic substitution regulation to be effective, a regres-
sive mark-up regulation would most likely be needed.9 
2.3 Regulatory schemes in Nordic countries 
Let us now consider the regulatory schemes in the Nordic countries ac-
cording to the different instruments used in demand-side and supply-side 
regulation. When making this classification, it is important to bear in 
                                                        
9 Brekke et al. (2012) study the pharmacies’ incentive to substitute generics for brand-
names, and show that this relies on the relative product margins and copayments. Using Norwe-
gian register data, they find that a higher margin on generics relative to brand-names is associa-
ted with a higher generic market share. 
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mind that many real-world regulatory schemes combine elements from 
the more stylized regulatory models presented above. We start by describ-
ing the demand-side regulations. Table 3 classifies the various instru-
ments used to affect the demand in the Nordic countries.   
Table 3. Demand side regulations in Nordic countries 
Country Reference 
pricing  
Reference pricing 
applies to 
Coinsurance  Regressive 
coverage 
Denmark Yes Same substance Yes Yes 
Finland Yes Same substance, 
off-patent only  
Yes Yes 
Iceland Yes Same substance Yes Yes 
Norway Yes Same substance, 
off-patent only 
Yes Yes 
Sweden Yes Same substance Yes Yes 
Source: Brekke et al. (2011b). 
 
The Nordic countries make use of reference pricing schemes to limit 
the reimbursement and induce patients to choose cheaper versions of 
drugs with the same chemical ingredient. In Norway, this is not the offi-
cial name given to the scheme.10 The system nevertheless has the funda-
mental ingredients of a reference pricing system. The same argument 
applies to Sweden, which does not officially use generic reference pric-
ing. However, since it is compulsory for pharmacies to perform generic 
substitution, unless the patient chooses to pay the price difference be-
tween the brand-name drug and the cheapest available generic drug, the 
system is a de facto generic reference pricing scheme.  
The reference pricing schemes in Denmark and Sweden are more ex-
tensive. In Norway and Finland, this scheme only applies to substances 
where the patent has expired and generic products have been introduced. 
However, in Denmark and Sweden, the reference pricing scheme also 
applies to patent protected products when parallel imported drugs with 
the same substance are introduced. In this sense, the Danish and Swedish 
schemes do not only exploit generic competition, but also competition 
from parallel trade in the on-patent market segment.   
                                                        
10 The scheme in Norway is called «Trinnpris», and implies a step-wise cut in the reference 
price (trinnpris) over time after generic entry.  
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Another difference between the Nordic countries is the formula for the 
reference price. Denmark and Sweden practice a strict scheme where the 
reference price is set equal to the lowest price of the drugs in a given 
reference group. In Norway, the reference price is a fixed discount on the 
brand-name price when generic entry took place. The Danish and Swe-
dish reference prices are updated frequently (every 14 days) and endoge-
nously determined by the price setting of the pharmaceutical firms. The 
Norwegian reference price is, however, exogenous and not dependent on 
the price setting by the firms after being exposed to reference pricing.  
In addition to reference pricing, all Nordic countries have copayments 
based on coinsurance, but there are some significant differences. In Nor-
way, the coinsurance rate is 38 percent. However, this is combined with 
copayment caps both per prescription and per year. The yearly cap also 
includes copayments on other health care services such as physician vis-
its, etc. For medical expenses exceeding the cap, there is 100 percent 
coverage. Thus, the de facto cost sharing is much lower than 38 percent. 
Notably, the surcharges under reference pricing are not subject to the 
copayment caps, and have to be paid out-of-pocket irrespective of the 
cap. In Sweden, the coinsurance rates vary according to the price of the 
drug. Expensive drugs face a lower coinsurance rate than cheaper drugs. 
This scheme is similar to the copayment cap scheme in Norway, but less 
discrete in its nature.  
Regarding the use of supply-side regulation, Table 4 summarizes the 
instruments used in the Nordic countries. 
Table 4. Supply side regulation in Nordic countries 
Country Price Cap 
regulation 
Mark-up regulation 
Wholesalers Pharmacies 
Denmark No No direct regulation Linear (% + flat fee) 
Finland Yes No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
Iceland Yes No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
Norway Yes No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
Sweden No No direct regulation Regressive (% + flat fee) 
Source: Brekke et al. (2011b). 
 
First, we see that Denmark and Sweden allow free price setting on 
pharmaceuticals, while Finland, Iceland and Norway resort to direct price 
control. The price cap scheme in Finland and Norway is based on interna-
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tional reference pricing. Norway uses a basket of nine  European coun-
tries as a benchmark.11 Finland uses a much wider set of countries, and 
includes most countries in the EEA. The price cap in Norway is fixed at 
the average of the three lowest prices in the reference countries. The Fin-
ish price cap formula is less transparent, and it is based more on a “rea-
sonable” price relative to the reference countries. Thus, it is less clear 
whether the Finish system is a strict price cap regime. Iceland bases the 
price caps on the average Nordic prices. A specific feature of the price 
cap regulation in Iceland is that separate caps are set for the original 
product and generic drugs. Denmark and Sweden do not control prices 
through price cap regulation, but rely more on their extensive reference 
pricing scheme to stimulate price competition from parallel trade and 
generic producers. However, they have some degree of price negotiations 
when it comes to the inclusion of drugs on the reimbursement list due to 
the requirements related to cost-effectiveness. 
The table shows that all Nordic countries practice mark-up regulation 
at the downstream level. The mark-up regulation is imposed at the phar-
macy level, leaving the wholesaler margins unregulated. The regulated 
mark-up is based on the wholesale prices (pharmacy purchasing prices) 
and consists of two parts; (i) a percentage add-on and (ii) a flat fee. In 
Denmark, the percentage mark-up is linear (8.6 percent) irrespective of 
the price level. In the rest of the Nordic countries, the percentage mark-up 
that pharmacies are allowed to add is lower for expensive drugs, and 
therefore regressive. However, all Nordic countries allow the pharmacies 
to add a flat fee for each pack sold. Interestingly, Sweden offers a higher 
flat fee (SEK 10) on generics and parallel-imported drugs than on brand-
names, yielding the pharmacies a financial incentive for generic substitu-
tion. In Norway, the regulation of pharmacy margins is not very effective, 
since more than 80 percent of the pharmacies are owned by the wholesal-
ers. The main purpose of the mark-up regulation is therefore to set the 
maximum price (price cap) at the retail level. 
Finally, we would like to mention that the taxation of pharmaceuticals 
varies across the Nordic countries. Some countries indirectly subsidize 
consumption of pharmaceuticals by charging a lower value-added tax 
(VAT) rate than on other products or services. The table below shows the 
                                                        
11 These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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regular VAT and the VAT imposed on pharmaceuticals in the different 
Nordic countries.  
Table 5. Value added tax rates in Nordic countries, 2011 
 Regular VAT % VAT % on pharmaceuticals 
  Prescription drugs Non-Prescription 
drugs 
Denmark 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Finland 23.0 9.0 9.0 
Iceland 25.5 25.5 25.5 
Norway 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Sweden 25.0 0.0 25.0 
Source: EFPIA/EU (2011). 
 
The table shows that the VAT rates vary across the Nordic countries. 
The governments in Denmark and Norway impose the regular VAT of 25 
percent on pharmaceuticals. However, Finland and Sweden subsidize 
pharmaceutical consumption by charging a lower VAT than the regular 
one. In Finland, there is a 9 percent VAT on both prescription and over-
the-counter drugs. There is no VAT on prescription drugs in Sweden, but 
OTC drugs are charged the regular VAT of 25 percent. 
To sum up, there is a considerable variation in the regulatory schemes 
in the Nordic countries, perhaps surprisingly large, despite the similarities 
between countries in this region. 
3. Do economic incentives matter? 
In this chapter, we will discuss how regulatory schemes and economic 
incentives matter in the choice of pharmaceuticals. We first look at gener-
ic substitution, and then therapeutic substitution, based on a recent study 
by Dalen, Locatelli, Sorisio and Strøm (2011).  
3.1 Generic substitution 
From March 2001, Norwegian pharmacies were allowed to substitute a 
branded drug for a generic version, independent of the product name 
prescribed by the doctor. Being permitted to intervene between the physi-
cian and the patient, the pharmacies got an active role in the market for 
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generics. The doctor can still guard against substitution, but this requires 
an explicit reservation to be added to the prescription note (“active substi-
tution method”).12 If the doctor refuses to substitute on behalf of a patient 
who is covered by the social insurance scheme, the brand-name price 
mark-up (as compared to the cheapest generic version) is paid by the 
social insurance scheme. Even without such a reservation by the physi-
cian, the patient may insist on the branded drug, in which case the phar-
macy is obligated to hand out the brand-name drug. In this case, the in-
surance scheme does not cover the price difference between the branded 
drug and the reference price. The difference has to be paid by the patient 
himself.  
Price comparisons with other Nordic countries showed, however, that 
the generic substitution introduced in 2001 was not sufficient to trigger 
price competition and lower retail prices. The weak price response of 
generic substitution motivated a new regulatory scheme – “index pricing” 
– introduced in March 2003. The index price scheme was established for 
six different drugs: omeprazol (ulcer), enalapril and lisinopril (high blood 
pressure and heart failure), citalopram (depression), cetirizin and lorata-
din (allergy). Simvastatin (high cholesterol) was added in June 2004. 
For these drugs, the regulator set a reimbursement price (the index 
price) to be paid to the expediting pharmacy, irrespective of what the 
chain paid for the chosen drug. This gives the pharmacies strong incen-
tives to facilitate fierce price competition between producers of generic 
drugs. The index price on a drug (chemical substance) was updated every 
third month, and set equal to the sales-weighted average of all prices 
reported by the pharmacy chains, plus a fixed distribution (wholesale and 
retail) margin. If a retailer selected a producer with a price exceeding the 
average of the sales-weighted average of all prices, the net margin of the 
integrated retailer-wholesale pharmacy firm drops below the fixed distri-
bution margin, whereas a retailer selecting a producer with a lower pro-
ducer price experiences an increase in his net margin. This way of regu-
larly updating the index price, based on observed producer prices from 
previous months, ensured that the index price tracked the development in 
producer prices over time. 
                                                        
12 Another doctoral procedure would be the “two-line method”. Here the doctor signs either 
on a line that reads “brand-name necessary” or on a line that reads “substitutions allowed”. Both 
methods have been in use in the US, and prove to have an impact on the number of refusals. The 
two-line method generates more refusals than the active substitution method (Hellerstein, 1998). 
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The index price scheme was expected to stimulate generic substitution 
in pharmacies, thereby triggering price competition between producers. 
Brekke et al. (2009) investigated to what extent the index price scheme 
was successful in stimulating price competition compared to the price cap 
regulation. They found that index price regulation significantly reduced 
both brand-name (by 18-19 percent) and generic prices (by 7-8 percent). 
Figure 4 shows the average price of brand-name drugs and generics from 
January 2001 to December 2004. The vertical line indicates the introduc-
tion of the index price scheme. The price drop following the index price 
scheme goes together with a substantial drop in the market share of 
brand-name drugs. 
Figure 4. Price per DDD for brand-name and generic, and brand-name market 
share in Norway 
 
Source: Brekke et al. (2009). 
 
In a follow up paper, Brekke et al. (2011a) showed that the index price 
regulation also triggered a significant shift in market shares towards ge-
neric drugs, which together with the price reductions resulted in substan-
tial cost savings of about 30 percent. 
In January 2005, the index price scheme was replaced with a new 
price regulation scheme that abandoned the direct use of economic incen-
tives to bring down pharmaceutical prices after patent expiration. The 
new scheme – called the step-wise (no. “Trinnpris”) model – consists of a 
predefined, stepwise reduction of the reimbursed price, starting from the 
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time of generic entry into the market. The pharmacies are instructed to 
have the drug available at the reimbursable retail price.  
The scheme gives the pharmacy chains strong incentives to lower their 
purchasing prices. The model does not prescribe any future price reviews 
based on the development of these prices. All cost savings – in terms of 
reduced purchasing prices – are kept by the pharmacies themselves. This 
scheme illustrates the fundamental trade-off that often has to be made in 
the regulation of prices. Maximum incentives to minimize costs (here to 
put pressure on the producer prices of generic drugs) are obtained by 
offering fixed retail prices. However, in order to be credible, these prices 
must be set at sufficiently conservative levels. If the government is too 
eager in reducing the cost of drug reimbursement – by setting the post-
generic prices at very low levels – the pharmacies will report economic 
problems which, in turn, will make it necessary for the government to 
increase the prices. When such a scheme could be enforced without pro-
tests from the pharmacy chains, there are good reasons to expect the pre-
determined prices to be pleasantly higher than the purchasing prices.13  
Dalen, Furu, Locatelli and Strøm (2011) investigate how prices, dif-
ferent regulatory schemes, and characteristics of patients, doctors and 
pharmacies affect the substitution between brand-name and generics. The 
choices of patients/doctors and pharmacies are modeled as a bilateral 
comparison between the utilities of using brand-name and generics. 
The analysis is not able to disentangle the doctors’ prescriptions and 
the choices made by the pharmacies, given that the doctor has not blocked 
for a generic substitute. The choice probabilities in the model are thus the 
product of the prescription probability and the choice probability of the 
pharmacies. In the empirical model, unobserved heterogeneity in the 
choice probabilities is allowed for.  
Data used in the estimation of the model was extracted from the Nor-
wegian Prescription Database (NorPD) at the Norwegian Institute of Pub-
lic Health. NorPD was established on January 2004. All drugs in Norway 
are classified according to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
classification system. From this database, Dalen, Furu, Locatelli and 
Strøm (2011) extracted the entire population of prescriptions in February 
2004 and 2006 for 23 different drugs (chemical substances) subjected to 
generic competition. This amounts to 313 078 observations (102 201 in 
                                                        
13 The step-wise model was proposed by the pharmacy chains. 
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February 2004 and 210 877 in February 2006). Between 2004 and 2006, 
several drugs were opened for generic entry, and this explains the in-
crease in the number of observations. The reason for adding February 
2004 as well as February 2006 was to capture the two regulatory 
schemes: the “index price” and “the step-wise price” model.  
With up to 23 chemical substances, they are able to cover a broad set 
of indications, such as blood pressure and heart failure, cholesterol, de-
pression, ulcer, antibiotics, and allergy. Several of the drugs in the study 
are among the most selling drugs in Norway, which was also the motiva-
tion for selecting these drugs. The drugs include simvastatin (cholesterol), 
cetirizin (allergy), and enalapril (blood pressure). 
Their empirical results imply that the larger the difference is between 
the price of the brand-name and generics, the less likely it is that the 
brand-name is purchased. Thus, generic substitution works.  
Patients with prescriptions covered by the national insurance scheme 
(No. “Blåresept”) are more likely to use the brand-name drug. Moreover, 
older patients are less likely to end up with a generic and older doctors 
are more likely to prescribe brand-names. They also find that time after 
generic entry matters: The probability of generic prescription increases 
with time after generic entry  generic substitution is less likely for young 
off-patent molecules. 
Of particular interest is the result of the impact of the index price 
scheme on the choice of brand versus generics. As mentioned above, in 
2004 this scheme should give the pharmacy an incentive to dispense 
cheaper versions. In Dalen, Furu, Locatelli and Strøm(2011), there are 
four chemical substances that were covered by this scheme in 2004. For 
these substances, the probability of choosing brand-names turns out to be 
lower than for other substances. The impact is strong, with a 26 percent 
lower probability of choosing brand-name versions instead of a generic 
drug. 
This result is in line with the results derived by Brekke et al. (2009). 
As mentioned above, they find that the index-price scheme had a signifi-
cant and strong impact on prices, both for generic and brand-name ver-
sions. Note that although the prices dropped and more so for the brand-
name, the price of the brand-name was still higher than for the generics. 
Another study of generic substitution in the Norwegian market is 
Brekke et al. (2012). This paper uses register data to compute the gross 
 Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? 269 
margins that the pharmacy chains have on selling brand-names and gener-
ics. The study reveals that the pharmacy chains obtain higher margins on 
generics, and find a strong, positive relationship between relative margins 
and the products’ market shares. They also show that this effect is strong-
er for the products under reference pricing. The results indicate that the 
pharmacies are more likely to promote a generic substitute to patients, the 
larger is the generic margin relative to the brand-name margin. Thus, 
financial incentives are important for pharmacies’ incentives to engage in 
generic substitution.   
Sweden introduced generic substitution in October 2002. Pharmacies 
were required to substitute the cheapest available generic for the brand-
name prescribed by the doctor. As in Norway, patient copayment in-
creased if the cheapest drug was not chosen. Granlund (2010) investigates 
the effect of the reform on prices and demand using panel data from 1997 
to 2007. He finds that the introduction of generic substitution on average 
lowered the prices by 10 percent. The price drop was strongest for brand-
name drugs that faced generic competition prior to the reform. For these 
drugs – the price-drop was 14 percent.  
A Finnish study reveals similar price responses to generic substitu-
tions, introduced in March 2003. Aalto-Setälä (2008) finds that the re-
form led to an average price drop of 10 percent.        
3.2 Therapeutic substitution: The market for Tumor Necrosis Factor 
(TNF) alpha inhibitors14 
Using a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, Dalen, Locatelli, 
Sorisio and Strøm (2011b) have investigated to what extent the price 
responsiveness of prescription choices is affected when the identity of the 
third-party payer changes and the choices are made between different 
drugs developed for the same diagnoses (therapeutic competition). The 
case in point is the Norwegian market for Tumor Necrosis Factor (TNF) 
alpha inhibitors.  
When the market for TNF-inhibitors opened in Norway in 2000, the first 
entrant Enbrel was fully covered by the obligatory national insurance 
plan. Treatment with Enbrel is initiated by the hospital doctor, but the 
                                                        
14 Dating TNF-alpha inhibitors representing the most important way of treating arthritis and 
other autoimmune diseases (Feldmann and Maini, 2003). 
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cost was automatically covered by the national insurance plan. The sec-
ond entrant Remicade did not obtain the same type of coverage. Instead, 
the treatment cost had to be fully covered by the doctor’s affiliated hospi-
tal. Importantly, the hospitals’ budget did not include any earmarked 
grants for these patients. The cost of treatment with Remicade, therefore, 
competed with other expenses within the hospital. This sharp asymmetry 
in funding schemes reflects a quality attribute of the two drugs. Enbrel is 
administrated by the patients themselves (pump injections), while Remi-
cade requires several hours’ infusion at hospitals. In the fall of 2002, the 
government modified the plan for Remicade. The government required a 
copayment of 20 percent from the doctor’s affiliated hospital. Enbrel 
maintained its full insurance plan coverage. The third entrant Humira is 
also administrated by pump injections by patients, and received the same 
funding plan as Enbrel when the drug entered in January 2003. 
An important policy change took place in 2006. Then, the asymmetry 
of financing among Enbrel, Humira, and Remicade was entirely removed 
by returning the entire funding responsibility to the hospitals for all three 
drugs. Since then, all costs of treatment with TNF-alpha inhibitors have to 
be covered by the doctors’ affiliated hospital.  
When estimating how economic incentives affect the choices of medi-
cal doctors and patients, one has to take into account that it is not only 
economic incentives that matter for the choices. The quality of the phar-
maceuticals as well as side effects may have an impact on the choices. It 
is then important to consider the obvious fact that these quality and side 
effects may be priced out in the market by the producers of the drugs.  
To deal with this problem, Dalen, Locatelli, Sorisio and Strøm (2011) 
jointly estimated the market share and price-setting equations, assuming 
monopolistic competition. The estimated coefficients imply that doctors 
appear to be significantly more price-responsive when the costs are cov-
ered by the hospitals as compared to when the costs are covered by na-
tional insurance. 
As expected, the numerical values of the own price elasticities in-
crease when quality aspects are accounted for (demand and price setting 
model) compared to when they are not (the market share model). The 
mean value of the own-price elasticities is given in the table below. 
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Table 6. Mean own-price elasticities 
 The market share 
model 
Demand and price 
setting approach 
Enbrel -0.59 -2.19 
Humira -0.92 -3.39 
Remicade -0.29 -1.02 
Source: Dalen, Locatelli, Sorisio and Strøm (2011). 
 
Thus, when quality and side effects are accounted for in the model, the 
numerical values of the own-price elasticities become much higher. In 
this case, therapeutic substitution between patented drugs therefore seems 
to be highly price-responsive. 
4. Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? 
We end this paper with a discussion of the problem raised by the title of 
our article – should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? Especially if we look 
at the Norwegian case, we see that pharmaceutical expenditure stopped 
increasing around 2005. Since then, we have even seen a slight drop in 
expenditure. This is not caused by a drop in the volume of pharmaceuti-
cals taken by Norwegian patients. The number of defined daily doses has 
been increasing after 2005. 
The main explanation for this combination of reduced expenditure 
levels and increased consumption of medicines is the increasing number 
of drugs that went off patent. For many years, The Association of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Norway (LMI) reported the market share of 
innovative drugs in Norway in their annual report “Facts and figures”.15 
During the 1990’s, innovative drugs represented an increasing part of the 
total sales volume. Since then, however, the innovation rate has declined 
with few new drugs and an increasing number of drugs that went off pa-
tent. In 2000, the market share of innovative drugs was reported to be 
close to 38 percent. In 2005, the market share was as low as 10 percent. 
The flattening expenditure curve in Norway is therefore explained by a 
more mature pharmaceutical market in combination with a regulatory 
                                                        
15 Innovative drugs are here defined as drugs that have entered the market during the last 
five years. 
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policy that has enabled a strong price competition on off-patent drugs 
(generics). Lowering the pharmaceutical costs by implementing fierce 
generic competition is welfare-improving and comes without any severe 
negative side-effects. 
However, it is of more interest to return to the political debate in the 
early 1990’s. During these years, pharmaceuticals costs were steadily 
increasing and caused increasing costs for the social insurance scheme. 
The government repeatedly expressed concerns for the expenditure 
growth, which was higher than the overall growth rate in health care cost. 
Since the growth rate was to a large extent caused by the introduction 
of new drugs, it is less clear if this is something to curb. New drugs im-
prove treatment which is to the benefit of patients, and these benefits 
should be compared with the costs of funding pharmaceuticals. 
In a series of papers, Frank Lichtenberg has empirically investigated 
the health effects of new drugs. Lichtenberg (2012a) shows that about 
one-third of the increase in German life-expectancy during 2001-2007 
can be explained by the replacement of older drugs with newer drugs. 
Lichtenberg (2012b) investigates the effect of new drugs on functional 
limitations of elderly Americans in nursing. Functional limitations are 
significantly lowered by the use of newer drugs at nursing homes. 
References 
Aalto-Setälä, V. (2008), The impact of generic substitution on price competition in 
Finland,  
European Journal of Health Economics 9, 185-191. 
Almås, I. (2012), International income inequality: Measuring PPP bias by estimating 
Engel curves for food, American Economic Review 102, 1093-1117. 
Arnberg, K., Linner, L. and Lunding, D. (2012), Prisutveckling på läkemedelsområdet 
i ett internationellt perspektiv: En internationell prisjämförelse av läkemedel utan 
generisk konkurrens, Tandvårds- och Läkemedelsförmånsverket, Stockholm. 
Brekke, K.R. (2009), Markedet for legemidler: Regulering, konkurranse og utgifte, in 
K. Haug, O.M. Kaarbøe and T. Olsen (eds.), Et helsevesen uten grenser?, Cappelen 
Akademiske Forlag, Oslo. 
Brekke, K.R., Grasdal, A. and Holmås, T.H. (2009), Regulation and pricing of phar-
maceuticals: Reference pricing or price cap regulation?, European Economic Re-
view 53, 170-185. 
Brekke, K.R. and Holmås, T.H. (2012), Prices of pharmaceuticals: A comparison of 
prescription drug prices in Sweden with nine European countries, Report 01/12, In-
stitute of Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen. 
 Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? 273 
Brekke, K.R., Holmås, T.H. and Straume, O.R. (2011a), Reference pricing, competi-
tion, and pharmaceutical expenditures: Theory and evidence from a natural experi-
ment, Journal of Public Economics 95, 624-638. 
Brekke, K.R., Holmås, T.H. and Straume, O.R. (2011b), Comparing pharmaceutical 
prices in Europe. A comparison of prescription drug prices in Norway with nine 
western European countries, Report 11/11, Institute of Research in Economics and 
Business Administration, Bergen. 
Brekke, K.R., Holmås, T.H. and Straume, O.R. (2012), Margins and market shares: 
Pharmacy incentives for generic substitution, NHH Discussion Paper, Bergen. 
Brekke, K.R., Königbauer, I. and Straume, O.R. (2007), Reference pricing of pharma-
ceuticals, Journal of Health Economics 26, 613-642. 
Dalen, D.M, Furu, K., Locatelli, M. and Strøm, S. (2011), Generic subsitution. Micro 
evidence from register data in Norway, European Journal of Health Economics 12, 
49-59. 
Dalen, D.M., Locatelli, M., Sorisio, E. and Strøm, S. (2011), A probability approach 
to pharmaceutical demand and price setting: Does the identity of the third-party 
payer matter for prescribing doctors?, CES Working paper 3643, Munich. 
Danzon, P.M. (1997), Pharmaceutical Price Regulation: National Policies versus 
Global Interests, The AIE Press, Washington DC. 
Danzon, P.M. (1999), Price Comparisons for Pharmaceuticals. A Review of U.S. and 
Cross-National Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC. 
Feldmann, M. and Maini, R.N. (2003), TNF defined as a therapeutic target for rheu-
matoid arthritis and other autoimmune diseases, Nature Medicine 9, 1245-1250. 
Granlund, D. (2010), Price and welfare effects of a pharmaceutical substitution re-
form, Journal of Health Economics 29, 856-865. 
Health at a glance (2011), OECD indicators, Paris, 
http://www.oecd.org/health/healthataglance.  
Hellerstein, J. (1998), The importance of the physician in the generic versus trade 
name prescription decision, RAND Journal of Economics 29, 109-136. 
Lichtenberg, F.R. (2012a), Contribution of pharmaceutical innovation to longevity 
growth in Germany and France, 2001-7, Pharmacoeconomics 30, 197-221.  
Lichtenberg, F.R. (2012b), The effect of pharmaceutical innovation on the functional 
limitations of elderly Americans. Evidence from the 2004 National Nursing Home 
Survey, NBER Working Paper 17750. 
Scherer, F.M. (2000), The pharmaceutical industry, in A.J. Cuyler and J.P. Newhouse 
(eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, North Holland, Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
 
 
 Comment on Brekke, Dalen and 
Strøm: Should pharmaceutical costs 
be curbed? 
Helgi Tómasson* 
The paper by Brekke, Dalen and Strøm starts by reporting some facts on 
pharmaceutical sales in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the 
year 2011. It is stated that the pharmaceutical cost per capita ranges from 
310 to 400 euros. The authors mention growth of sales, and correctly state 
that not much can be inferred on data for only two years. The sales are 
decomposed into price and volume and it is stated that Norway tends to 
have the cheapest drugs. They correctly cite that exchanging, say, 
Swedish prices and Norwegian prices would affect price indices as the 
consumption weights differ between the two countries. The authors also 
discuss the impact of packaging. The drugs are packed differently among 
the countries which adds to the heterogeneity. The volume of the con-
sumption is highest in Sweden but lowest in Denmark. The low consump-
tion and high sales in Denmark are due to the high price of drugs in Den-
mark. All these facts support the claim that an international comparison is 
difficult. 
The authors characterize the nature of the pharmaceutical market as a 
low price elasticity on the demand side and strong market power on the 
supply side. These oligopolistic characteristics result in widespread regu-
larization systems around the world. The authors summarize some impor-
tant regulatory instruments. The arsenal of instruments is large both on 
the demand- and the supply side, as well as for price-based and non-price-
                                                        
* University of Iceland, helgito@hi.is. 
276 Nordic Economic Policy Review, Number 2/2012 
based instruments. The Nordic countries seem to use most of these in-
struments. The authors review some differences in how the Nordic coun-
tries implement the instruments, e.g., how they treat on-patent drugs, 
what kind of mark-up is allowed, taxes, etc. 
Next, the authors turn to the questions, “Do economic incentives mat-
ter?” and “What is a good policy?”. The econometric toolbox seems quite 
similar to what is described in Train (2009) and what the authors have 
used in other publications. Dalen et al. (2011) is cited and a model from 
this reference is described. To fully understand the econometrics in this 
paper, it is necessary to look up the formulas and concepts in these refe-
rences. A large data set containing all Norwegian prescriptions from Fe-
bruary 2004 to February 2006 is described. A scenario of the behaviour of 
doctors and patients is drafted. Even here, the paper would benefit from a 
formal statement of the model. Perhaps a graph showing the timing of the 
events could be helpful. 
The authors report an interesting experiment, the index pricing, intro-
duced in 2003. The idea of the index pricing strategy is to fix the reim-
bursement for some popular categories of drugs irrespective of what the 
pharmacy paid for each brand of drug.  
In 2005 a new experiment, the stepping price model, replaced the 
index pricing model. The authors conclude that the regulatory instruments 
seem to have an impact, in particular they favour the index pricing model. 
The question of the impact on health seems to be left open. That question 
might be a much more challenging one. 
The authors have used a large data set. The quality of the information 
of such a data set, and any data set, depends on the exact definition of the 
scientific model and the corresponding statistical model. 
The paper is essentially a literature overview of, first, the regulatory 
environment of pricing of pharmaceutical products in the Nordic coun-
tries and, second, a discussion of a few econometric results that the aut-
hors have derived in earlier research (Brekke et al., 2009; Brekke et al., 
2011) on responses and preferences in the pharmaceutical market. The 
conclusion seems to be that the pharmaceutical costs can be curbed, but it 
is less clear whether they should be.  
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